

Message Text

SECRET

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 02504

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TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF PLENARY MEETING,
FEBRUARY 16, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO.143

1. SUMMARY: AT PLENARY MEETING OF FEB. 16, SOV REP
(MOROKHOV) INTRODUCED ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE FOR THE
ANNEX TO THE MULTILATERAL TREATY DEALING WITH INTER-
NATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE (ISDE). THE LANGUAGE
INCORPORATED MANY OF THE US SUGGESTIONS PUT FORWARD IN
FEB. 10 PLENARY. HOWEVER, MOROKHOV REGISTERED STRONG
AND FAMILIAR OBJECTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION (ICC) PROPOSED BY THE US. IN RESPONSE TO UK
STATEMENT WHICH STRESSED THE NEED FOR SOVIET MOVEMENT ON
DURATION ISSUE AND PNE LINKAGE, MOROKHOV COMPLAINED THAT
THE RECENT SIGNS OF SOVIET "GOODWILL" ON PNES HAD NOT
BEEN MET BY CORRESPONDING MOVES BY THE US AND UK AND

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IMPLIED THAT THE PROMISED SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE
DURATION ISSUE WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING UNTIL THIS
OCCURRED. IN RESULTING SHARP EXCHANGE, US REP (WARNKE)
RESPONDED WITH A STRONG STATEMENT REMINDING THE SOVIETS
THAT THE US HAD MADE A MAJOR MOVE TOWARD THE SOVIET
POSITION ON ON-SITE INSPECTION AND COULD JUSTIFIABLY
EXPECT RECIPROCAL MOVEMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION ON THE

ISSUES OF TREATY DURATION AND PNE LINKAGE. HE SAID UNLESS THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO PRESENT IDEAS TO BRIDGE THE VERY LARGE GAP BETWEEN THE PARTICIPANTS ON THE PNE/DURATION ISSUES THERE WOULD BE LITTLE HOPE FOR SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF FEB. 16 SOV REP (MOROKHOV) DELIVERED A STATEMENT DEALING WITH PROCEDURES FOR PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE UNDER THE MULTILATERAL TREATY. HE SAID THE US STATEMENT OF FEB. 10 REFLECTED A "REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE" APPROACH WHICH SHOULD FACILITATE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEMENT. HE PRESENTED A WORKING PAPER CONTAINING ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE FOR THE ISDE GUIDELINES TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE ANNEX TO THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT, EMPHASIZING THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD TRIED TO TAKE US PROPOSALS INTO ACCOUNT ON MANY ISSUES AND HAD ADOPTED MANY OF THE US FORMULATIONS VERBATIM. (TEXT SEPTEL.)

3. AFTER NOTING POINTS OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN US AND SOVIET TEXTS HE REITERATED SOVIET DELEGATION'S PREFERENCE THAT ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BY AN AD HOC COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS OF STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY, ON THE BASIS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SEISMIC EXPERTS OF THE CCD, RATHER THAN BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, AS THE US PROPOSED--AN ORGAN WHICH, IN THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S VIEW, WOULD BE "NEEDLESS AND EVEN HARMFUL." HE BELIEVED SECRET

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THE SOVIET APPROACH MET THE TWO MAIN NEEDS OF THE SITUATION. IT WOULD ON THE ONE HAND PERMIT THE PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE ISDE AND PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS THROUGH OTHER PROVISIONS IN THE TREATY (E.G., THE RIGHT OF CONSULTATION, OF CONCLUDING SEPARATE AGREEMENTS, AND APPEALING TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL). AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIET APPROACH WOULD PROTECT THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY THROUGH APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS IN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, MOROKHOV AGAIN ENDORSED THE CONCEPT OF A JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION UNDER THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. HE STRESSED THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUS INHERENT IN AN ICC AND THE POTENTIALLY UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING NON-NUCLEAR STATES TO BRING UP FOR DISCUSSION QUESTIONS OF TREATY COMPLIANCE AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. HE NOTED, FINALLY, THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE SUPPORTED ON ITS OWN MERITS BY THOSE STATES WHICH FAVORED DISARMAMENT.

4. HE SUGGESTED THAT A WORKING GROUP SHOULD PROCEED TO WORK OUT CONCRETE LANGUAGE FOR THE ANNEX ON ISDE GUIDELINES WHICH HE SAID IN HIS DELEGATION'S VIEW DID NOT NEED TO BE VERY DETAILED.

5. US REP WELCOMED THE SOVIET STATEMENT WHILE NOTING THAT SOME DIFFERENCES STILL REMAINED, PRINCIPALLY OVER THE ISSUE OF WHETHER ISDE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT THROUGH AN ICC AS THE US HAD SUGGESTED, OR THROUGH A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS AS THE SOV DEL WAS PROPOSING. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE THREE DELEGATIONS HAD COMMON OVERALL OBJECTIVES IN THIS AREA. HE SUGGESTED THAT A WORKING GROUP COULD EXPLORE THE MATTER FURTHER.

6. ACTING UK REP (EDMONDS) DELIVERED STATEMENT RESPONDING TO TWO POINTS MADE BY MOROKHOV IN HIS FEB. 13 PLENARY

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STATEMENT; THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROPOSED ISI DESIGN TO THE NEEDS OF VERIFICATION AND PNES (TEXT SEPTTEL). ON ISIS HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR AGREEING ON THE PERFORMANCE AND RELIABILITY REQUIRED FROM ISIS FOR THEIR TASK OF VERIFICATION BUT SAID THE PURPOSE WAS NOT TO PROPOSE A DESIGN FOR ISIS THAT WOULD HAVE A CAPABILITY BEYOND WHAT WAS NEEDED FOR ENSURING CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE. ON PNES HE TOOK NOTE OF CERTAIN "ENCOURAGING" POINTS IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF FEB. 13 BUT STRESSED OBVIOUS DEFECTS OF SOVIET POSITION AND URGED THE SOV DEL TO MOVE ON THE ISSUES OF DURATION--INCLUDING TREATY DURATION, PROVISIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL AND THE DURATION OF THE PNE BAN.

7. MOROKHOV, IN REPLY, STRESSED AGAIN THE UNIQUE ECONOMIC MERITS OF PNES. ON THE ISSUE OF TREATY DURATION, PNE PROTOCOL AND ENTRY INTO FORCE, HE SAID THE SOVIET DEL SAW NO BASIS FOR ALTERING ITS PRESENT POSITIONS, SINCE THE "GOODWILL" MANIFESTED BY THE SOVIETS HAD NOT BEEN MET WITH

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CORRESPONDING MOVES BY THE US AND UK.

8. IN STRONG REPLY, US REP RESPONDED THAT UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO PRESENT IDEAS THAT WOULD BRIDGE THE VERY CONSIDERABLE GAP BETWEEN THE SIDES ON THE ISSUES OF TREATY DURATION AND PNE LINKAGE, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE HOPE FOR SUCCESS. THE US HAD MADE A MAJOR MOVE TOWARDS THE SOVIETS ON ON-SITE INSPECTION AND WE EXPECTED RECIPROCAL MOVEMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION ON DURATION AND PNES. WITHOUT NEW IDEAS, WE WOULD BE RIGHT BACK WHERE WE WERE IN EARLY OCTOBER, THOUGH HE CONTINUED TO HOPE THAT THE SOVIET INITIATIVE OF NOVEMBER 2 REPRESENTED MORE THAN MOROKHOV HAD INDICATED.

9. IN SHARP REPLY, MOROKHOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF NOV. 2 HAD NOT ELICITED AN APPROPRIATE REACTION FROM THE WEST. HE SAID THAT IN THE SOV DEL'S VIEW THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE ATTEMPTING TO POSTPONE THE ISSUE OF PNES UNTIL THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE ON "QUESTIONS RAISED EXCLUSIVELY BY THEM." THE SOV DEL SHOULD BE ALLOWED IN THAT CASE TO CHOOSE THE ISSUE THAT IT WOULD POSTPONE.

10. AT THE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, US REP SUMMARIZED THE NATURE OF THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND SOVIET SIDES ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF PNES. HE STRESSED THAT THIS COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE RESOLVED NOW BY DRAFTING OF THE PNE PROTOCOL. HE RECALLED THE ELEMENTS OF THE ISSUE LAST OCTOBER AND SAID THAT WE HAD HOPED THAT THE SOVIET NOV 2 INITIATIVE WOULD PERMIT US TO PUT THE CONFLICTING VIEWPOINTS OFF FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION. FOR OUR PART, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK IN GOOD FAITH ON THE PROBLEM BUT THE SOVIET SIDE MUST UNDERSTAND WHY WE COULD NOT ACCEPT SOVIET PROPOSALS WHICH PREJUDGED THE ISSUE AND WHICH WOULD PERMIT A PNE MORATORIUM TO LAPSE, IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN AGREEMENT ON ACCEPTABLE PNE PROCEDURES,

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WHILE A WEAPONS BAN CONTINUED. US REP THOUGHT THAT THE BEST WAY TO BEGIN MAKING PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES WAS TO CONSIDER TREATY DURATION, AN AREA WHERE THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD HAVE SOME NEW IDEAS. HE URGED THAT WORK

CONTINUE ON ALL FRONTS.

11. MOROKHOV SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE TWO GENERAL COMMENTS. THE FIRST WAS AN ILLUSTRATION OF HOW IMPORTANT PNES WERE TO THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WAS A PLACE NEAR AFGHANISTAN WHERE THERE WAS A VERY UNSTABLE DAM AND THERE WAS A THREAT OF COLLAPSE AND GREAT HARM TO THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION. THERE WERE ONLY TWO WAYS, ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE SPECIALISTS ON HIS DELEGATION WHO HAD JUST SPENT TWO HOURS BRIEFING HIM ON THE SUBJECT, THAT THE DANGER COULD BE AVERTED. EITHER PNES WOULD BE USED, BECAUSE THIS WAS THE ONLY FEASIBLE ENGINEERING TECHNIQUE, OR WE WOULD PRAY TO GOD.

12. MOROKHOV'S SECOND COMMENT HAD TO DO WITH THE WORK ON VERIFICATION. THERE, HE THOUGHT, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS, THERE WERE GREAT COMPLEXITIES AND DIFFICULTIES. THE US EXPERTS WERE PROVIDING THE SOVIET DELEGATION WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE DISTANT FUTURE. THESE INVOLVED NEW EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE EXTRAORDINARY SENSITIVITY AND WHICH SOVIET SPECIALISTS WANTED TO STUDY WITH THE GREATEST CARE. THE SOVIET SPECIALISTS WERE CONCERNED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOME OF THESE INSTRUMENTS WERE SO SENSITIVE THAT THEY COULD DETECT MISSILE LAUNCHES. (MOROKHOV ASKED THAT THIS COMMENT NOT BE REPORTED.) BUT THE AMERICAN SIDE HAD NOT YET PRESENTED TO THE SOVIETS A COMPLETE LIST OF DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE EQUIPMENT AND JUSTIFICATIONS. MOROKHOV FELT THAT THIS ISSUE, WORKING ON VERIFICATION, SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY, AND NOT DURATION. THE DISCUSSION ENDED INCONCLUSIVELY.

13. FOR LONDON AND MOSCOW: CTB MESSAGE NO. 142 TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON ONLY. WARNKE

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